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ABSTRACT
Most of the large firms organization schemes consist in hierarchical structures of
tiers with different wage levels. Traditionally the existence of this kind of organiza-
tions has been associated to the separation of productive and managerial or supervi-
sion tasks and differences in the skills of the workers. Nevertheless, in the present
there are in firms with similarly skilled workers where the hierarchical structure
could be related to an incentives scheme to make the agents work. The model we
present tries to inquire how the firm owner should decide the optimal wage distribu-
tion in order to maximize the profits obtained by the firm.
Keywords: Optimal wages, hierarchies, firm structure, incentives scheme, moral hazard.
1. INTRODUCTION
The classical principles of Economics, since the D. Ricardo (1817) time, say that
the wage earned by a worker should approximate, in a competitive free market econ-
omy, to his or her marginal production. This statement is valid when it is easy to cal-
culate the marginal product of a worker and there are few management tasks as, for
example, in small size firms.
Cuadernos de Economía. Vol. 30, Núm. 82, enero-abril, 2007, págs. 037-074
38 FRANCESC DILMÉ I SOTO
Nowadays a great portion of the society is employed in large firms, that many
times have an international scope, with thousands of employees around the world. In
fact, many economic historians, as Chandler (1962), have documented that an impor-
tant part of the economic development in the last centuries has been driven by large
scale organizations, some of them with hundreds of thousands of employees. In these
large firms is difficult to calculate the marginal production of every individual
employee and the effort he or she supplies. Moreover, the wage is usually contracted
before the performance of the productive process, and usually all employees with the
same rank earn the same wage regardless the effort supplied.
The production of these large firms depends on the effort supplied by their
employees, that many times is a hidden action, not easily observable by the firm own-
er. This fact provides incetives to the employees to shirk. Dickens, Katz, Lang and
Summers (1989) present extensive evidence of the importance of worker shrinking in
the firms of United States. By his hand, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) show the correla-
tion between worker’s effort and forces like anger, jealousy and gratitude. Moreover,
in the large firms is difficult to make contracts linking the wage to the overall pro-
duction of the firm. Nevertheless, this possibility does not solve the problem, because
when the number of workers is large the performance of the whole firm is not linked
to the individual effort.
In most of the moral hazard literature it is assumed that the cost of supervising
the effort supplied by the employees is quite large. This circumstance generates a sit-
uation with asymmetric information between the firm owner and the employee,
where only the employee knows the effort he or she supplies, the «hidden action».
Then the effort, as a non measurable variable, usually can not be included in the con-
tracts between the principal and the agent. The elaboration of incentive mechanisms
to increase the effort supplied of the agents to be competitive is an important issue
for the large firms.
A first possibility to provide motivation to the workers to supply effort is through
punishment schemes that try to detect shirking and penalize this behavior, common-
ly named «stick-schemes». These schemes consist with stochastic inspections to the
workers and penalizations if they are found shirking, that usually consist in firing
them. There are models like Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) that present where the firms
have limited monitoring abilities and force the workers to exert effort through a sto-
chastic process that allows the detection of shirking at a certain probability rate. Nev-
ertheless, it is usually difficult to have irrefutable proofs that the worker has been
shirking continuously, and without these proofs the legal system does not allow to fire
a worker.
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Qian (1994), following Calvo and Wellisz (1978,1979), develops a model of opti-
mal hierarchical organizations. These models treat the hierarchies as supervisory
schemes where in the bottom tier of the firm there are the productive workers, that
produce the good that is sold by the firm. The rest of tiers is a system where every
agent supervises the agents in the immediately lower tier. The optimal structure tries
to prevent the «loss of control», that is, the lack of supervision of the lower tiers. This
vision is far of being realistic in present firms, specially those that belong to the serv-
ices sector, where the tasks of upper tiers of the hierarchy are varied and often not
specially correlated in monitoring the effort of the lower tiers agents.
The other possibility of make the agents supply effort is through positive incen-
tives, commonly named «carrot schemes». The optimal contracts theory provides dif-
ferent contracts in situations where the agents supply effort that is not directly observ-
able by the principal. Then, the principal pays to the agent the information rent,
related with the fact that the agent knows information unknown by the principal (the
effort he or she supplies). This model is not always applicable, because of its the
assumptions not always hold. It is usually hard to know about the probabilities of the
different states of the nature, some kinds of the contracts are not legally allowed,...
Holmstrom (1982) formalizes the model of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) of opti-
mal contracts in cases of moral hazard in teams, treating the firm as essentially a team
where only the aggregated output is observable. The principal objective of this kind
of contracts is to avoid the free rider worker, than receives a wage without doing
effort. By his part, Tirole (1986) develop the collusion-proof contracts, in order to
avoid collusion among agents or among the supervisors and the workers. These mod-
els are interesting in the contract theory, but they do not explain the hierarchical struc-
ture of the firms.
Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983) develop the optimal design
of tournaments, modelling the incentives to work as lotteries with prizes. In this kind
of lotteries, the probability of winning the prize depends stochastically on the effort
performed by the contestants. In this model, the contestants decide the effort they sup-
ply and after the nature alters stochastically the result of their «investment». Finally a
prize is given to the player that has the high observable investment. Then, the proba-
bility of winning the lottery depends on the effort individually supplied, but in a sto-
chastic way. This game of tournament can only be solved analytically when only two
players are considered, but it is not consistent with most of the upgrading procedures
in large firms. Moreover, the Lazear-Rosen model does not explain the hierarchical
wage structure of the firms, and wage contracts, that many times are uncorrelated to
the production, are usually non treatable as prizes to the production.
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In the large firms, that usually have highly hierarchical structures, the agents usu-
ally have a stronger incentive to work: to be upgraded. In fact, many large firms have
a structure based in different tiers with increasing wages. In this structure, when a
new worker is hired, he or she begins in the lowest tier of the firm, and supplying
effort he or she is upgraded with some probability. The incentive of higher future
salaries provides to the workers high incentives to effort, specially when competition
to be upgraded among workers plays an important role. Then, upgrading mechanisms
where the probability of success depends on the own supplied effort can incentive the
agents to work. The incentive of increase the utility usually comes from the possibil-
ity of being upgraded, that is, the incentive of achieve a new wage level.
Many times the necessity of a hierarchical structure in the large firms does not
only arise from the necessity of management tasks, but also from the necessity to pro-
vide incentives to the agents to supply higher levels of effort. This incentive-based
wage structure usually implies that agents will be payed under their marginal pro-
duction in the lower tiers and agents payed above their marginal production in the
higher tiers. In fact, there are many firms where the high wage increases from one tier
to the next one make hardly conceivable that the productivity of an agent that is
upgraded increases in accordance with them. Moreover, it is often possible to find
highly skilled workers in the job market or in lower tiers capable of supplying simi-
lar productivity than the agents of the high tiers for lower wages, but firms do not low
the wages of the higher tiers in order to maintain the incentives of their agents.
We now propose a model based in this observable behavior of the firms and the
agents. We assume that when there is a vacancy in a certain tier on the salary ladder
there is a lottery among the agents in the lower tier to occupy this vacancy. The prob-
ability that each agent has to win this lottery depends on the effort supplied by him
or her.
This paper is organized in 5 sections. After this introduction, in the second sec-
tion the general the model is established, analyzing the production, the probability of
being upgraded and the moral hazard. The third section presents a particular case,
where the agents can only choose among two efforts. In the fourth section the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium is solved. In the fifth section there are many comparisons of
the results previously obtained, specially comparing the two particular cases and also
the different scopes of the problem. In this section we also will treat inequality issues.
Finally, we will present the conclusions that can be obtained from the results pre-
sented.
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1 From now we note R+ as the non negative reals, including the 0. For the moment we
assume en effort without upper bound, that can seen non realistic, but as we will see it will be
naturally bounded.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Production
Let’s establish first the production side of the firm. We assume that the firm,
through the effort of the agents, produces an homogeneous product, that is sold at a
nominal price p > 0 taken as given by the firm. We also assume that there are no oth-
er production costs than the wages payed to the agents. This assumption is equivalent
to suppose that the costs other than the wages are proportional to the production, and
the net revenue of every unit of good is its price. The firm owner, then, have as nom-
inal revenue the overall production of the firm multiplied by the price of this product,
and the wages payed to the workers as costs.
We define a firm as a structure Q ∈ N of jobs organized in N ≤ Q subsets or tiers,
each one with a large number of jobs given by Qn, and with an associated wage, wn,
with n = 1,…, N. We assume that the wages are arranged in rising order, w1 ≤…≤ wN.
At every instant of time Q individuals, called agents, belong to the firm, and occupy
one and only one job. Every job belongs to one tier, and then ∑Nn=1 Qn = Q. We will
assume that the wages that the firm owner can establish have a lower limit, given by
a minimum wage wb. This minimum wage can be established by the government, for
example through minimum wage law, or by the market, for example as an opportu-
nity cost of the agents.
Every agent can supply an effort given by1 λi ∈ R+. We assume that the produc-
tion depends linearly on the effort through a productivity that depends on the tier
where the agent works. The real productivity per unity of effort worked by an agent
of the tier n will be noted by An, and then the production of an agent that belongs to
the tier n and supplies an effort λi is An·λi. The nominal productivity is given by the
product of the real productivity and the price of the good. The overall nominal pro-
duction Ynom will be given by the following function
Ynom = 
n=1
∑N p·An·–λn·Qn,
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where –λn is the average effort supplied by the agents in the tier n. Because the firm
owner can not observe the effort supplied by the agents, he or she pays the same wage
to all the agents belonging to the same tier, given by wn, regardless the effort they sup-
ply. Then, the nominal production costs Cnom are given by
Cnom = 
n=1
∑N wn·Qn
The nominal profits of the firm are given, as usual, by the nominal production
minus the nominal costs. Then, the profits function Pnom is given by the following for-
mula:
Pnom = Ynom – Cnom = 
n=1
∑N (p·An·–λn – wn)·Qn
The firm owner faces the problem of maximize this nominal profits function. In
general he or she will decide the wages of all the tiers, with the constraint of being
higher or equal than the minimum wage wb. We will consider additionally the case
where the firm owner can also choose the firm organization, that is, the number of
agents in every tier {Qn}, and maximize the profits optimizing also these values.
Then, in general, the firm owner can not decide the average effort of every tier,
because every agent decides the effort he or she supplies individually and it can not
be observed, but can influence the decisions through changes in the incentives to win
the lotteries, changing the wages and the firm organization.
All the nominal variables we have just presented can be translated to the real
analogous variables just dividing them by the general price level of the economy. We
will consider that the production of the firm represents an small proportion of the
overall production of this good, and that this good represents only a small portion of
the consumer basket. Then, changes in the price of the product without changes in the
nominal wages will not affect the real wage of the workers of the firm. Nevertheless,
when later in the paper we will consider the whole economy and the aggregated pro-
duction, the price of the aggregated production will represent the general price level,
and then the real variables will be strongly dependent of the price.
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2 Examples of the impossibility of fire workers are the functionaries, that can not be fired
except in extreme cases, and labor laws that do not allow to fire workers except when there are
irrefutable proofs of their shirking, that are difficult to obtain.
2.2. Probability of being upgraded
We assume that the agents that belong to the firm can leave it, process that will
be called «death». An agent then can «die» due the corporeal death, but also because
the agent reaches the retirement or the agent decides to change the firm where he or
she works. We make the simplifying assumption that the death rate is the same by all
the agents that work into the firm, regardless their age or the tier they belong. Then,
the process of dying can be treated as a stochastic exponential process of constant
rate, that will be noted by d. At every moment of time, the probability of every agent
of surviving a time τ from this moment is e–d·τ, and in particular, when τ = ∆t is small,
the probability of dying can be approximated by d·∆t. The life expectancy of every
agent in the firm is 1/d.
When an agent that belongs to the firm dies he or she leaves a vacancy in his or
her tier. We assume that this vacancy can only be occupied by an agent of the imme-
diately lower tier through a mechanism of selection, that will be treated later in this
paper. We also assume that the agents can not be degraded or fired2. Then, in every
tier the vacancies can only be produced by the upgrading of an agent from this tier to
the immediately upper tier or by the death of an agent of this tier. It implies that, when
an agent that belongs to certain tier dies, there is a cascade effect, producing an
upgrading chain of all the tiers lower than this one. When there is a vacancy in the
lowest tier, the tier 1, one worker is automatically hired by the firm.
The assumption of automatic hiring of an agent can be understood as the exis-
tence of a minimum wage established by the government and an unemployed pool of
agents that are eager to work at the wage w1 ≥ wb. In this case, we can assume that
their reserve utility is sufficiently low to accept immediately a job in the firm. Anoth-
er possible assumption is to assume a reserve utility established by the opportunity
that the agents in the labor market have. Then, we can assume that there is no mini-
mum wage and the only restriction for the wages is that they should be non negative.
The results in this case are similar to the establishment of the minimum wage by the
government, and we will obviate this case.
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3 As in the process of dying, the relevant concept is the probability rate and not the prob-
ability itself. It is due we are considering the probability of being update per unity of time.
Let’s now inquire about the probability of being upgraded at a certain tier. One
agent will be upgraded when a vacancy is produced on the next tier. In general, the
probability rate3 of occurring one vacancy at a certain tier will be constant. In fact, it
is easy to show that when the dying rate is constant, the number of deaths of agents
in higher tiers than a certain tiers follow a Poison process, with constant probability
rates. We denote qn the probability rate of occurring a vacancy due an upgrading in
the tier n. The condition of replacing all the people who leave the tier is given by
dien upgn upgn–1
0 = ·Qn = – d·Qn – qn·Qn + qn–1·Qn–1 ,
This condition says that, in order to maintain the number of agents in every tier
n, the number of agents who are upgraded from the tier n to the tier n+1 plus the
number of agents who die in this tier must be the same that the number of agents who
are upgraded from the tier n–1 to the tier n. Note that only the agents in the tier just
below can occupy the vacancy, and not agents in lower tiers or upper tiers.
From the previous equation we can express the upgrading rate of a certain tier
with respect the upgrading rate of the following tier. Then we obtain the following
expression
(d + qn)·Qnqn–1 = —————— (2.1)Qn–1
When the structure of the firm is finite with N tiers, the upgrading probability rate
of the top tier, qN, must be 0. For a given structure of the firm. i,e. for given values of
Qn, and a probability rate of dying d, the relation (2.1) establishes a recurrence for the
upgrading rates that can be solved analytically. Then, for every n < N, we can obtain
the following expression for qn:
{ { {
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d·∑Ni=n+1 Qiqn = ——————. (2.2)Qn
Let’s now interpret (2.2). If we rearrange this equation we obtain, multiplying
both sides by a small period of time ∆t, the following equation
∆t·Qn·qn = ∆t·d·i=n+1∑
N
Qi . (2.3)
The left side of this equation is the number of people who is upgraded from the
tier n in a small period of time ∆t. In the right side we have the people in higher tiers
that die in this period of time ∆t. In order to supply sufficiently people to preserve the
number of agents in each tier, the number of upgrades in a certain tier must equal the
number of deaths in all the higher tiers.
Although the agents are identical they can supply different efforts. We will treat
the process of upgrading when there is a vacancy in a certain tier as a lottery among
all the agents in the lower tier. We assume that the probability of winning this lottery
and then be upgraded may be different for the various agents in the tier, depending
on the effort individually supplied and on the distribution of efforts supplied by the
rest of the agents in the tier, that every agent take as given. Then agents know that
supplying effort does not guarantee to be upgraded when there is a vacancy, but alters
the probability of being upgraded. This implies that the process is not properly a
game, because the strategies of the individual players are not mutually influenced.
Nevertheless, the distribution of strategies of the other agents in the same tier will
affect the strategy of an agent, and then some concepts of the Game Theory would be
considered.
The literature introduces this kind of lotteries in different ways. The optimal con-
tract theory usually considers that the results of the work of the agents depend on the
effort supplied by them in a stochastic way. When the success of the agents in their
work is included in the upgrading criteria, the process is clearly dependent on the
effort. Moreover, when the upgrading criteria may include the experience, the busi-
ness network and other aspects that depend on the effort in a stochastic way, the
process of selecting candidates to be upgraded depends stochastically on the effort
individually supplied. The rank-tournaments literature is another important example
of the use of effort-dependent lotteries in order to incentive the effort of the agents.
The probability rate of being upgraded of every agent individual agent in the tier
depends on his or her own effort, but also on the effort supplied by the other agents
46 FRANCESC DILMÉ I SOTO
in the same tier. Then, given a distribution of efforts of the other agents in the same
tier
~λn, we note the individual probability rate of being upgraded of an agent that sup-
plies an effort λi as qin (λi, 
~λn). The mean of the probabilities of being upgraded of all
the agents must be equal to the probability of any agent of being upgraded, and then
we have the following condition
qin (λi, 
~λn) = qn , (2.4)
where the upper bar means average among the agents in the tier n.
In some parts of this paper we will consider the simplifying assumption that the
individual probability rate of being upgraded depends on the distribution of efforts of
the other agents in the same tier only through its mean, 
–λn. It is easy to show that the
only function that depends on the own individual effort and the average effort that
verifies the property (2.4) for all possible realizations of ~λn is the linear probability
rate given by
a(–λn) + b(
–λn)·λi
qin (λi, 
–λn) = ———————————·qn ,
a(–λn) + b(
–λn)·
–λn
with a(–λn) ≥ 0. The case b(·) = 0 is the case when the probability of being upgraded
is independent of the effort the agents perform. An additional possible requirement is 
∂
impose —— qin (λi, 
–λn) > 0, that is equivalent to impose that the probability of being ∂λi
upgraded rises with the effort, what implies b(·) > 0. In this case the probability rate
of being upgraded becomes
c(–λn) + λi a(
–λn)
qin (λi, 
–λn) = ——————·qn ,   with   c(
–λn) = ——— ≥ 0 . (2.5)
c(–λn) + 
–λn b(
–λn)
In general, under these assumptions, the probability rate of being upgraded when 
c(–λn)
the effort is 0 is given by —————·qn.–λn + c(
–λn)
An interesting concrete form for the function c(·) is the linear form c(s) = c·s, with
c a non negative constant. The derivative of the probability of being upgraded with
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4 Expected in the sense depends stochastically on the effort supplied but also in the sense
that the agents do not know when they will die, and then, although the expected wage is defined
for all times t ∈ R+, the wage will not be earned and the effort will not supplied after their death.
respect the effort is a decreasing function of c, an then we can interpret c as a meas-
ure of the insensibility of the premium of being upgraded. In fact, the derivative of
the individual probability of being upgraded with respect the effort individually 
–λn–1
supplied is ———·qn. The larger c is, the lesser sensible is the probability rate of being 1+c
upgraded qin (λi, 
–λn) to changes in the effort individually supplied, λi. Moreover, when
c = 0 the probability of being upgraded of an agent that supplies a nil effort is 0, and 
c
in general is ———·qn, that is a decreasing function of c.1+c
2.3. Utility and moral hazard
As we have seen, the firm owner pays the same wage to all the agents in a given
tier. On one hand, since the effort of the agents is not observable and they do not like
to supply effort, they have incentives to not supply any effort. On the other hand,
because the probability of being upgraded rises with the effort supplied, if the expect-
ed utility of the agents in the next tier is higher than the expected utility of the own
tier, they have incentives to supply effort in order to be upgraded and improve their
level of utility. Then, the agents solve their maximization problem of deciding the
effort they supply taking as given the wages of all the tiers, the structure of the firm,
the utility of the next tier and the effort supplied by the other agents in the tier.
The agents being contracted have preferences on the effort they supply and the
wage they earn. The agents, like in the Ramsey model (1928), want to maximize a
intertemporal utility along their lives, maybe sacrificing the utility of today in order
to improve the utility of tomorrow. Because agents do not know the exact moment of
time they will dead, there is a discount term e–d·t, noting the probability of being alive
in the time t. Then, when they make decisions, they make expectations about their
expected utility, and then decide. An agent with an expected4 wage w(t) and effort
λi(t), for each t ∈ R+, has an expected utility given by
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U(w, λi) = ∫0∞ e–d·t·u(w(t), λi(t))·dt ,
where u(w, λi) is the instantaneous utility when the wage is and the effort is λi. As
usual we will assume that uw > 0, uλ < 0, uww < 0 and uλλ < 0.
The agents will decide their effort along their life, λi(t), and this decision will
imply an expected wage in every time t, given by w(t), because the effort of the oth-
er agents are taken as given. In general, the wage along the life of an agent, or at least
his expected wage at every moment of time, will be a function of his or her effort.
Then, we can suppose that agents have their expectations about the wage at every
moment, w(t, λi). The agents problem is to solve the following problem
U = ma
λi
x ∫0∞ e–d·t·u(w(t), λi(t))·dt ,
with a given initial wage w(0, λi). We will define Un as the maximum utility of the
people who at time t = 0 are in the tier n, and then have as initial wage w(0, λi) = wn.
The expected utility we have just presented depends only on the initial tier of the
agent, that establishes the initial value of the wage. The maximizer agent solves at
every moment of time the same problem of choosing the effort he or she supplies
depending on the tier he or she belongs. Then we can assume that every individual
agent supplies a constant effort when he or she is in a given tier, that can be different
of the effort of the other agents in the same tier. Moreover, the agents in the same tier
are indistinguishable, in the sense that the decisions are taken in the basis of the
future, and at every moment all the agents have the same possible decisions to take.
Because the agents maximize their expected utilities, they will choose the maximum
expected utility, and then the expected utility of every agent of the same tier will be
the same, given by Un.
Suppose now that the expected utility of a certain tier n + 1, Un+1, is given and
known. Then people who are in the lower tier faces the following maximization prob-
lem
Un = maλix [∫0∞ qin (λi, ~λn)·e–qin (λi, ~λn)·t·(∫0∞e–d·s·u(wn, λi)·ds +e–d·t·Un+1)·dt ]
u(wn, λi) + qin (λi, 
~λn)·Un+1 (2.6)
= ma
λi
x [ —————————————— ] ,d + qin (λi, ~λn)
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where ~λn is the distribution of the efforts of the agents in the tier n, that every single
agent takes as given, and qin (λi, 
~λn) is the upgrading probability rate of an agent of
the tier n that supplies an effort λi when the distribution of efforts of this tier is ~λn.
This formula provides us a relation among utilities of different tiers, and will be use-
ful in the future in order to solve recurrently the problem.
The agents in the highest tier, the tier N, do not have any incentive to work,
because they can not be upgraded. These agents do not supply any effort, and only
leave this tier when they die. The utility of the agents in the tier N is given by
u(wn, 0)UN = ————— . (2.7)d
This formula can be used, through the equation (2.6), to obtain UN–1, and then
obtain UN–2,... Then, we can obtain all the utilities from the top tier to the bottom.
Using the expression for the expected utility (2.6) we have that the incentive com-
patibility condition can be written, for an agent belonging to the tier n that supplies
an effort λi and for an effort distribution on the tier ~λn, in the following form:
u(wn, λ'i) + qin (λ'i, 
~
λn)·Un+1
= ——————————————— if λ'i ∈ ~λn
u(wn, λi) + qin (λi, 
~λn)·Un+1
d+qin (λ'i, 
~λn)
——————————————— (2.7)
d + qin (λi, 
~λn)
u(wn, λ'i) + qin (λ'i, 
~
λn)·Un+1
≥ ——————————————— if λ'i ∉ ~λn
d+qin (λ'i, 
~λn)
This expression says that if there is an agent that chooses λi and another agent
chooses λ'i, their expected utility must be the same.
A stable state in our problem will be given by a set of {wn, 
~λn, Qn} for  n = 1,…, N
that verifies the equations (2.6) and (2.8). In this case, by the incentive compatibility
condition, the agents do not have incentives to alter the effort individually supplied
in any tier, taking as given the distribution of efforts of the other agents in the same
tier, 
~λn. Then, every agent faces the following problem
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
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∂U(wn, λi) ∂ u(wn, λi) + qin (λi, 
~λn)·Un+10 = —————— = —— ( ——————————————— )∂λi ∂λi d + qin (λi, ~λn)
∂(d·Un+1 – u(wn, λi))·——qin (λi, 
~λn) + (d + qin (λi, 
~λn))·uλ(wn, λi)∂λi
= —————————————————————————————————
(d + qin (λi, 
~λn))2
Finally, this relation can be arranged in order to obtain an interpretable expres-
sion for the incentive compatibility condition:
∂(d·Un+1 – u(wn, λi))·——qin (λi, 
~λn)
∂λi
–u(wn, λi) = —————————————————— (2.9)d + qin (λi, 
~λn)
∂
= (Un+1 – Un)·——qin (λi, 
~λn) . (2.10)
∂λi
This equation means that marginal increment of expectancy gain of utility (right
side) must equal the marginal disutility of increasing this quantity of effort (left
side).
3. TWO-VALUED EFFORT
The first interesting case is the two valued effort (TVE) case, that consists in con-
sidering that the agents, in their decision of supply effort, can only choose among two
given values, a low effort and a high effort. Then, in every tier there will be two sub-
sets of agents, the agents that supply a low effort and the agents that supply a high
effort. We will make the simplifying assumption that the low effort is 0 for all tiers,
and the high effort value of the tier will be noted by λn.
This first simplifying assumption is common in the study of the principal-agent
problems, where the agent can choose among a finite number (often only 2) possible
elections unobservable by the principal. An example when this condition holds is, for
example, when there is an important cooperation with the different agents who work
and the nature of the work does not permit to work more than the others of the group.
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Otherwise, there are many other tasks that can be done or not, but there are no inter-
mediate possible elections.
Let’s assume a linear individual probability rate of being upgraded, as the shown
in (2.5). Moreover lets assume that the function takes the linear form c(s) = c·s, with
c a non negative constant. In this case, the individual probability of being upgraded
for an agent being in the tier depends on the effort individually supplied λi in the fol-
lowing form
c
——— if λi = 0 ,
1+c
qin(λi, 
–λn) = λn+c·
–λn
————— if λi = λn ,–λn·(1+c)
were, as before, 
–λn is the average effort of the tier n. We denote γn ∈[0,1] as the pro-
portion of agents in the tier that supplies the higher effort λn, named working agents.
This definition allows us to write the average effort of the tier n as 
–λn = γn·λn. When
γn = 0 the production of the agents in the tier n will be 0, as in the tier N, where we
always have γN = 0. When γn = 1 all the agents in the tier n supply the high effort.
The problem that an agent of the tier n faces when he or she decides the effort
supplied when the utility of the next tier Un+1 is given is the following maximization
problem:
c·
–λn+λi
u(wn, λi) + —————·qn·Un+1–λn·(1+c)
Un = max { ———————————————— }λi∈{0,λn}
c·
–λn+λid + —————·qn–λn·(1+c)
c 1+c·γn
u(wn, 0) + ———·qn·Un+1 u(wn, λn) + —————·qn·Un+11+c γn·(1+c)
= max { ———————————————— , ———————————————— }c 1+c·γnd + ———·qn d + —————·qn1+c γn·(1+c)
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
52 FRANCESC DILMÉ I SOTO
The agents will choose the level of effort that maximizes their utility. Let’s first
consider that the equilibrium is reached when 0 < γn < 1, that is, when the two options
(supplying a low or a high effort) have the same expected utility. In this case the fol-
lowing condition holds
c 1+c·γn
u(wn, 0) + ———·qn·Un+1 u(wn, λn) + —————·qn·Un+11+c γn·(1+c)
—————————————— = Un = ———————————————— . (3.1)
c 1+c·γnd + ———·qn d + —————·qn1+c γn·(1+c)
The left side of the equation allows us to find a relation among the expected util-
ity of every tier and the expected utilities of the next tiers. Using the formula (2.7) we
can then obtain the expected utility of a given tier n as a function of the wage of this
tier and the wages of all the tiers higher than n. In general this is a complicated rela-
tion, except in the case when c = 0, because in this case the utility of all tiers is given 
u(wn,0)by —————.
d
Note that the equation (3.1) may not hold when all agents work, γn = 1, or when
no agent works, γn = 0. If, for example, all the agents in the tier n work we can sup-
pose that the maximizer capitalist, in order to maximize its profits, will lower the
wage of the tier n + 1 until the moment that the agents in the tier n are indifferent to
work and not work. Doing this the firm owner reduces the costs, the production of the
tier n is not altered and the proportion of working agents in the tier n + 1 do not
decrease, because the difference between the utilities of the tier n + 1 (that decreas-
es) and the tier n + 2 (that remains constant) is higher than before. Nevertheless, low-
ering the wage of the tier n + 1 agents their utility also decrease, and then the utility
of the tier n. This fact can lower the average effort supplied by the agents in the low-
er tiers and then decrease the profits. In the case n = 1, because changes in the utili-
ty of this tier do not affect at the utility of other tiers, and then the equation (3.1) even
in the case γ1 = 1.
When the equation (3.1) holds we can obtain the formula for the proportion of
working agents, given by
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u(wn,0)
–λn
qn·(Un+1 – ———— )d
γn = —— = —————————————————————— . (3.2)λn d·((1+c)·d + c·qn)·(u(wn,0) – u(wn, λn))
u(wn,0)In the numerator of this expression we can interpret ———— as the expected utilityd
of an agent that remains all his or her life in the firm in the tier n without supplying
effort. This will occur, for example, when c = 0, because in this case the agent that
does not supply effort remains always in the same tier until his or her death. The pro-
portion of workers that supply the high effort is 0 only when the expected utility of
the next tier, Un+1, is equal to the expected utility in the case if the agent remains until
his or her death in the tier n without supplying any effort. It may be surprising that
this result not only holds when c = 0, that is, when supplying a nil effort implies the
impossibility of being upgraded, but also when an agent that supplies a 0 effort can
be upgraded.
We observe from (3.2) that the number of agents that supply the high effort
depends differently on the various variables. It depends positively on the probability
rate of being upgraded, because more possibilities of upgrading the agents have, more
incentives to supply effort they have. It depends negatively on the death rate, because
less important is the future (higher death rate), less incentives they have to supply
effort. It depends positively on the difference of the utility of the next tier and the cur-
rent tier, because larger is the difference of utilities, more incentives the agents have
to supply effort. It depends negatively on the difference of the utility of non making
effort and making effort, because larger is the difference or utility on working or non
working, more incentives have the agents to not supply effort.
Let’s measure the profits that a firm faces for a given set of wages {wn, n=1,…,N}.
Using (3.2) we obtain the following formula for the profits
N–1 N–1
Pnom = ∑ p·An·λn·γn·Qn – ∑ wn·Qn
n=1 n=1
(3.3)
N–1 p·An·λn·γn·qn·(d·Un+1 – u(wn, 0))
= ∑ ( —————————————————————— – wn)·Qn .
n=1 ((1+c)·d + c·q)·(u(wn, 0) – (u(wn, λn))
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If the efforts {λn,n=1,…,N–1} can not be chosen by the firm owner, the firm faces
the problem choose the set of wages that maximize the profits. Then, the first order
condition (FOC) is a set of N differential equations with the following structure
∂Pnom0 = ———, n =1,…, N .∂wn
This set of equations is in general hard to resolve because we have N entwined
equations with N unknown variables. Moreover, when the firm owner can choose the
high effort of every tier, λn for n = 1,…, N, we should add N – 1 equations to the equa-
tions system, since the effort λN is irrelevant because all agents in the tier N supply
an effort equal to 0.
Let’s now add to our model some simplifying assumptions that will allow us to
obtain analytical results. These assumptions are not too restrictive and they will allow
us to obtain new interesting general results, that will be useful to interpret the firm
structure in depth. We first assume that the utility can be decomposed in two additive
parts, one depending (positively) on the wage and the other (negatively) on the effort.
Then, the utility is given by
u(w, λ) = uw(w) – uλ(λ) = wα – B·λβ , (3.4)
that verify u'w > 0, u'λ > 0, u"w < 0 and u"λ < 0. In the particular form we have 
∂γn0 < α < 1, B > 0 and β > 1. In this case is easy to obtain that ——— < 0, that is, higher 
∂wn
is the wage of a certain tier, lower are the incentives of the agents to supply effort.
When c = 0 the profits that faces the firm can be easily written as a function of the
maximizing wages of the different wage levels in the following way
N wα1Pnom = ∑ wn·Qn·( 1 – α ——— ) . (3.5)
n=1 w
α
n
where wn = wn(λ1,…, λN–1).
Assume that the firm owner can choose the efforts λn, for n=1,…,N–1. The max-
imization problem with respect to the efforts is equivalent to the following FOCs:
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∂Pnom (1–α)·Qn wα1
——— = —————·( 1 – —— ) > 0, for 1 < n ≤ N ,∂wn α wαn
∂Pnom N wn1–α
——— = –∑ ———·Qn < 0 .∂w1 n=1 w11–α
The first equation says that raising the wage of every tier greater than 1 the prof-
its increase. The wages of the tiers from 2 to N should be raised as possible, that is,
until the moment that the proportions of working agents reach their maximum, that
is, γn = 1 for n=1,…,N–1. This imply that, when the firm owner can choose the efforts,
he or she chooses them providing incentives to make all the agents work. Below this
tier every increase of the wage of the next tier increases the proportion of working
agents, and then the production, sufficiently to compensate the increase of the costs.
Over this tier an increase of the wage of the next tier does not make sense, because it
does not increase the production and increases the costs.
By its hand, the wage of the first tier should be lowered as possible, that is, until
w1 = wb, because the derivative of the profits with respect this wage is negative.
Because changes in the lowest tier wage do not affect the expected utilities of the
higher tiers and then the effort supplied by the agents in the other tiers remains
unchanged, when the wage is lowered the average effort of the tier 1 agents increas-
es (an then the production) and the costs decrease. Then, when the utility is additive,
the firm owner will choose the minimum possible wage for the agents in the tier 1,
w1 = wb,. This can not be applied to the other tiers, because changes the wage of the
tier n > 1 affect the expected utility of the agents in this tier, and then also affect the
effort supplied by the agents in all the lower tiers.
Let’s now consider, in order to obtain analytical results, a firm with only two
tiers, assuming a general c ≥ 0. Now the effort supplied by the second tier agents is
0, because the second is the highest tier and its agents have no incentives to work. In
this case the equation (3.1) only is applicable to n = 1, and then this equation always
holds. Using the equation (2.2) we obtain that the number of agents in the tiers 1 and 2 
d
with respect q1, because now we have q2 = 0, are respectively Q1 = ———·Q and 
q1
d+q1
Q2 = ———·Q, being the total number of workers in the firm. Because in this case the d+q
parameter q1 determines the organization of the firm we will call it the structure para-
meter.
When the firm can not choose the structure parameter the only variable that the
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firm owner should decide is the wage of the second tier, noted by w2. Using now the
value of the utility of the highest tier, that is given in the equation (2.7), the equation
(3.3) turns to be
q1·(uw(w2) – uw(wb)) d·Q d·Q q1·QPnom = ——————————————————·p·A·λ1·——— – wb·——— – w2·——— .((1+c)·d + c·q1)·(uλ(0) – uλ(λ1)) d + q1 d + q1 d + q1
The FOC of this maximizing problem is given by the following expression
q1·((1+c)·d + c·q1)
u'w(w2) = ———————————·(uλ(λ1) – uλ(0)) .d·p·A.λ
This equation that, inverting the derivative function of the wage part of the utili-
ty function, gives us the wage w2 that maximizes the profits.
In order to obtain a concrete expression for the wage w2, we assume a particular
form for the utility form (3.4). Then, the expression that we obtain for the wage is
——
1
d·p·A
1–α
w2 = ( ————————————— ) . (3.6)((1+c)·d + c·q1)·B·λ1β–1
We observe from the previous relation that the wage of the 2nd tier agents is
inversely correlated to the effort. It can seem counterintuitive, because the firm own-
er offers high second tier wages when the high effort of the tier 1 wages is lower. But,
as we will see, the variable that counterbalance this counter intuitive relation is the
number of working agents. If there is a low effort and the wage of the higher tier ris-
es, the number of working agents increases sufficiently to increase the production
more than the increasing costs that comes from the rising of the wage.
If w2 < wb the wage of the tier 2, due the condition of minimum wage, must be
equal to wb. In this case the result is the same that having a firm with only one tier,
because all agents have the same wage and all agents supply a nil effort, because there
are no incentives of being upgraded. The profit function is given by
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Pnom = Ynom – Cnom = 0 – Q1·wb – Q2·w2 = –Q·wb .
Then, in this case there is no problem of optimization.
If w2 > wb then the firm owner chooses the wage w2 given in the formula (3.6).
This condition, through the inverse relation between the wage and the effort supplied,
establishes a lower limit for the possible values of λ1, that we call λb, where w2 = wb.
In the higher tier, as usual, no agent works, and in the lower tier the proportion of
workers is
w2
α
– wαb q1γ1 = —————·—— .B·λβ d
Using now the condition γ1 ≤ 1 for a given q1, we can establish a lower limit for
λ1, noted by λl, where γ1 = 1, that is in general lower than λb and that does not have
an analytical form. At the same time, for a given λ1, this condition establishes a upper
limit for q1.
From now we assume that w2 > wb or, what is the same, λ1 < λb. The profit where
the wage of the agents in the tier 2 is chosen optimally, given by w2(λ1) in (3.6), can
be written in the following interesting form
q1 (1–α)·w2(λ1) q1 w21–α(λ1)·wab dPnom = ( ———·———————— – ———·———————— – ———·wb )·Q , (3.7)d + q1 α d + q1 α d + q1
were here w2 ≡ w2(λ1). Suppose now that the firm owner can choose the effort λ1, that
is, the effort supplied by the working agents in the tier 1. The FOC resulting from this
maximizing problem can be expressed as:
∂Pnom ∂Pnom ∂w2(λ1) (1–α)·q1·Q wαb ∂w2(λ1)
——— = ———·————— = ——————·( 1 – ———— )·————— < 0 .∂λ1 ∂w2 ∂λ1 α·(d + q1) w2α(λ1) ∂λ1
Since under our assumptions this expression is always negative, the maximum
profit is obtained when λ1 reaches its minimum, that is, when λ1 = λl. When this con-
dition holds, as we have seen, all tier 1 agents work, and then γ1 = 1. It may seem sur-
prising that the firm maximizes its profits when the effort supplied by the tier 1 agents
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5 The instantaneous utility of the non working agents in the tier 1 is not altered, since is
given by wαb, and the instantaneous utility of the working agents is increased, since the wage
remains unaltered (hold in wb) but the effort decreases. Nevertheless, as γ1 increases, some peo-
ple pass from not work to work, implying a loose of instantaneous utility.
6 As is said in the footnote 5, is Pareto optimal in the sense that every «class» of agents are
at least better than in any other case. In fact, the instantaneous utility of the working agents in
tier 1, the non working agents in the tier 1 and the agents in the tier 2 increase or remain con-
stant.
is minimum and the wage of the second tier agents is maximum. As we have seen, it
is due to the fact that the increase of the number of working agents more than com-
pensates the losing of productivity per working agent and the costs of paying higher
wages.
From (3.6) the effort of the working agents is inversely related with the wage of
the second tier. Then, for a given wb, the larger will be w2, the larger will be the util-
ity of the working agents in tier 15, and the larger will be the utility of the agents in
the tier 2. When firms maximize the profits, the result is Pareto efficient6. From this
condition we can obtain the expression of wb with respect w2, because the relation
w2(wb) it is not obtainable analytically. The result obtained is
dβ·αβ·pβ·Aβ
——
1 ——1
wb = w2·( 1 – ( ——————————————————)β–1)α (3.8)q1β–1·((1+c)·(d+q) – q1)·B·w2β–α
We can introduce now the relative wage among the tiers in order to express ana-
wblytically our variables, denoting rw = ——. The values that can take the relative wage 
w2
are bounded by 0 and 1. Then, the wage of the agents in the tier 2 takes the follow-
ing form:
αβ·dβ·pβ·Aβ
——
1
w2 = ( ——————————————————— ) β–α (3.9)B·q1β–1·((1+c)·d + c·q1)·(1–rw)β–1
Let’s introduce competition among firms. In a competitive market the firms that
produce the same product will compete reducing prices. Because the firm is produc-
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ing in real terms (quantity of good) meanwhile the workers wage is indexed nomi-
nally, when the price of the product decrease the profits decrease. Moreover, assum-
ing that the economy is split in a large number of markets, one for every good, we
can assume that the real wage of a worker do not depend on the price of the product
he or she is producing, but only on the nominal wage he or she receives. This assump-
tion is equivalent to impose that the general price level remains constant regardless
the price of the good the firm produces, because it represents a small share of the con-
sumption.
Imposing the condition of zero profits to the equation (3.3), we obtain the fol-
lowing relation among the final relative wage and the structure of the firm:
q1 α·rw
—— = —————— . (3.10)
d 1 – α – rαw
This equation establishes an increasing relation between the relative wage rw and
the firm structure parameter q1 when competition makes the profits to be 0. This
equation implicitly give us the price as a function of the structure parameter q1,
because, in fact, we can write rw(p,q1). Moreover we find an upper limit for the rela-
tive wage rw, given by r*w ≡ (1–α)1/α. This limit corresponds to q1 → ∞ or Q2 → Q,
that is, where all agents are in the tier 2. Note that this relation holds regardless the
firm owner can choose the high effort λ1.
4. SYMMETRICAL NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Now we assume that every agent can choose the effort he or she supplies among
all the non negative reals. The agents will increase their effort only if this decision
makes their expected utility to increase, following the equation (2.9). Then, the prob-
lem turns to be a game, where many players are the agents trying to choose the best
strategy, the effort they supply, in order to maximize the outcome of the game, the
expected utility.
Lets now consider the symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) of our problem, that
is, a situation where all agents have individual incentives to supply the same effort.
In many problems of identical players treated in the context of the Game Theory the
symmetrical Nash equilibrium is a fundamental concept, which is used to obtain
results of many different problems, that go from firms competition to consumer’s
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behavior. In this case we can consider the competition of the agents in every tier as a
game with identical players, where the strategy of every agent is given by the deci-
sion of the effort he or she supplies. The final level of effort that is common among
the agents in a certain tier is neither decided by the firm owner nor the individual
agents, but from a process of competition among the agents that ends with a state
where all agents individually decide to supply the same effort than the other agents.
Let’s return to the condition of immediate occupation of the vacancies of the first
tier. In the TVE case the assumption that there is a pool of unemployed agents dis-
posed to work in the firm at wage wb (established by the government) or that the
agents have a reserve utility were essentially the same when c = 0. It was due the
expected utility of the agents in the tier 1 was wαb/d, and then the utility and the min-
imum wage are clearly correlated. The SNE case can be solved assuming that the firm
has to provide a minimum utility in the first tier, instead of a minimum wage, and the
results are similar to those obtained with the minimum wage assumption. Neverthe-
less we will assume that there is a minimum wage established nominally by the gov-
ernment, because the analytical expressions are more simple and the results are easi-
ly comparable with the TVE case.
In this case we can use, additionally to the equation (2.6), the equation (2.9), that
states that every agent, given the effort supplied by the other agents, chooses his or
her effort in order to maximize the own utility. This equation shows that, when the
agents choose the effort they supply among all real values, they choose a local max-
imum. In our case, in a symmetrical solution, all agents supply the average effort of
the tier considered, that is λi = –λn and qin = qn. Then, the condition (2.9) takes the fol-
lowing form
∂(d·Un+1 – u(wn, 
–λn))·——qin(λi, 
–λn)|λi=–λn∂λi
————————————————————— = –uλ(wn, 
–λn) .d + qn
We assume a linear function qin(λi, 
–λn) as the shown (2.5). In particular, as in the
case of a two valued effort, we consider c(s) = c·s, with a non negative constant. Giv-
en these assumptions the equation (2.9) turns to be
d·Un+1 – u(wn, λn)
—————————————·qn = –(d + qn)·uλ (wn, λn) . (4.1)(1 + c)·λn
where, from now, we will denote λn ≡
–λn. This equation allows us to find a relation
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7 Another difference is that in the two valued effort model we allow to work only a part of
the agents, and the others supply effort 0. Nevertheless, as we have seen, when the firm owner
can choose the higher effort he ore she has incentives to make them all supply effort, and then
the difference disappears.
between λn and wn, depending on Un+1. Using this relation the firm owner can maxi-
mize the profits choosing the maximizing wage for every tier.
In order to obtain analytical results we assume the same utility function as in the
two valued effort case (3.4), a form with two additive terms, one depending on the
effort and the other on the wage. Moreover, we will assume that the two components
of the utility have a form with constant elasticity of substitution, formally the same
utility that is used in the previous section.
Let’s now consider, as in the case of a two-valued effort, the case of a firm with
only two tiers, in order to obtain analytical results and to compare them with the
obtained in the former case. Recall that the main difference between these two mod-
els is the fact that in the two valued effort case the level of effort was given or estab-
lished by the firm owner while in this case the effort is decided by the competing
agents7. As in the TVE case, we have , and then the number of agents of the different 
d q1tiers are given by Q1 = ———·Q and Q2 = ———·Q. The tier 2 now is the highest tier d+q1 d+q1
and then the effort supplied by its agents is 0, and then the utility of the agents in this
tier is the given by (2.7).
The concrete form of the utility we have assumed allows us to express the equa-
tion (4.1) in the following way
d·(w2α – w1α – B·λ1β)
———————————·q1 = (d + q1)·B·β·λ1β–1 .λ1·(1 + c)
Then, this maximization condition allows us to write the a relation among the
effort supplied by the agents in the tier 1 and the wage of the agents in the tier 2, that
is given by
q1·(w2α – w1α) —
1
λ1 = ( ————————————— )β .B·(β·(1+c)·(d+q1) – q1)
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In this case, differently of the TVE case, where the effort is related to the wage
through the equation (3.6), the effort supplied depends positively on the tier 2 wage.
As in the case of the TVE, the firm owner had incentives to hold the wage of the
agents in the lowest tier to the lowest possible wage, because, as we have just seen,
lowering this wage the agents supply a higher effort (increasing the production) and
the costs decrease. Then, we have that w1 coincides with the minimum wage, w1 = wb.
Suppose first that the firm organization is given, that is, the firm owner takes q1
as given. The problem that faces the firm owner is to find the wage of the tier 2 agents
that maximizes his or her profit, that is
q1·(w2α – wbα) —1 d·Q d·Q d·Q
max [ p·A·( ————————————— )β ·———— –wb·———— –w2·————] .w2∈R+ B·(β·(1+c)·(d+q1) – q1) d + q1 d + q1 d + q1
The corresponding FOC to this problem, as in the case of a two valued effort, is
an equation impossible to solve analytically for w2. Nevertheless, as in the case of
the two valued effort, we can obtain the expression or wb with respect w2, that now
is given by
dβ·αβ·pβ·Aβ
——
1
—
1
wb = w2·( 1 – ( ————————————————————)β–1)α (4.2)q1β–1·(β·(1+c)·(d+q1) – q1)·ββ·B·w2β–α
This relation is similar to (3.8). The only difference is a term in the denominator
of the division inside the parenthesis, that in the TVE case is ((1+c)·(d+q1) – q1) and
now turns to be (β·(1+c)·(d+q1) – q1)·ββ. Note that the two results are equivalent if we
replace all the β that not appear in the exponents by 1 in (4.2).
Lets now write w2 as a function of the relative wage. As in the TVE case, it is use-
wbful to express the quantities with respect the relative wage rw = ——. Introducing the 
w2
relative wage to the equation (4.2), it can be inverted and we obtain
dβ·aβ·pβ·Aβ
——
1
w2 = ( ———————————————————— )β–α (4.3)B·ββ·(β·(1+c)·(d+q1) – q1)·(1-rαw)β–1
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Then, for a given q1 and p, when the relative wage is hold at some level, w2
become automatically defined. Comparing this equation with the analogous one in
the case of a two-valued effort, (3.9), we observe that the only difference is again only
given by the terms that have β outside the exponents. Note that, all things equal, w2
is lower in the SNE case than in the TVE case.
Now consider the situation where competition among firms makes the the price
decrease until the moment where firm faces zero profits. Similarly to the TVE case,
we can obtain the following condition that ensures that the profits become 0:
α
q1
—·rwβ
—— = —————— . (4.4)
αd 1 – — –rwαβ
This equation is another time similar to the same condition in the TVE case,
shown in (3.10), being equal when we replace α by α/β, except in the exponent, in
this equation. Then, the upper limit for the relative wage is given by (1 – α/β)1/α. This
point establishes the upper bound of rw, and corresponds to the configuration where
all agents are in the tier 2. Given the equation (4.4) we can express all the variables
of our problem with respect the relative wage or the structure parameter q1.
5. COMPARISON
In this section we try to compare the results obtained in the TVE case and the
SNE case, presented in the sections 3 and 4. The two cases we have treated present a
lot of similarities and few differences, but small differences in the short run can pro-
duce huge differences in long run.
In both cases we have studied previously only one variable remains uncon-
strained, once the maximization problem is solved and the condition of nil profits
holds, and when the firm organization can be chosen by the firm owner. For conven-
ience, to obtain analytical expressions for all the variables, in each case we have cho-
sen the relative wage rw to be the free variable. Nevertheless, using this variable is dif-
ficult to compare the two cases presented, because the range of the possible relative
wages are different, form 0 to (1 – α/β)1/α in the case of the two valued effort and
from 0 to (1 – α/β)1/α in the case in the two groups, as it can be seen in the expres-
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sions (3.10) and (4.4). Then we need another variable to compare the figures of the
two models.
We can use as variable by representing the number of agents in the tier 2, given 
q1by Q2 = ————·Q, that goes from 0 (all agents in the tier 1) to Q (all agents in the q1 + d
tier 2). Remember that in both cases the relations (3.10) and (4.4) establish a strictly
increasing function of the number of agents of the tier 2 and the relative wage. Then,
the number of agents in the tier 2 is a good variable, because determines all other
variables in one way and has the same range in both cases. The number of agents in
the tier 2 does not allow us to write analytical expressions, but allows us to compare
graphically the different relevant variables. Moreover, the proportion of agents
among the two tiers many times is given by specificities of the productive process of
every concrete good, what makes this variable more suitable when we analyze a con-
crete good.
5.1. At firm level
The firm takes the price of the good produced and the nominal minimum wage
of the economy (both indexed in monetary units and not in product units) as given.
As we have seen, then it maximizes its profits choosing the optimal wage of the sec-
ond tier workers, and, in the TVE case, the high effort of the tier 1 agents.
In order to compare the results obtained for the TVE case and the SNE case lets
first look at the figure 1 (a), that corresponds to the wages and efforts in a single firm
for every given quantity of agents in the tier 2, when at every point the price verifies
the free entry condition, implying nil profits, that depends on the structure of the firm.
We have assumed that the nominal minimum wage wb is established exogenously. At
a single firm level the nominal wages coincide with the real wages, because we
assume that the good that the firm produces represents a small part of the consump-
tion of the agents, and then changes in its price do not alter the general price level.
Then, the workers of a firm consider the nominal wages when they decide the effort
supplied. We observe that both the effort and the second tier wage are higher in the
TVE case.
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If one sector face extraordinary profits, new firms are attracted to the sector, and
then the price decreases, until the moment that profits are 0. In the figure 1 (b) we
represent the nominal production, the real production (measured in number of units
produced) and the price of the product that implies nil profits for all possible struc-
tures of the firm, parameterized by Q2. Every sector in the economy may have speci-
ficities in the production process that establish a concrete Q2, and then the price of
the product will tend to the value of the price depicted. Our model predicts differ-
ences of prices among different goods due the differences in the organizations of the
firm that produce them. Cause, as we have just seen in the part (a) of this figure, the
effort supplied by the tier 1 agents is higher in the TVE case, and so is the real pro-
duction in this case. Moreover, because the nominal wage paid to the tier 2 agents in
the TVE case is higher than in the SNE case, it implies that the nominal production
in the TVE case must be higher than in the SNE case.
When the structure parameter can not be eligible by the firms, the competition
decreases the price until the moment that the profits turn to be 0. The price when the
profits are 0 takes the following form:
wb·d + w2·q1 wb w2·q1p = ——————— = ———— + ———— .
λ1·A·d λ1·A λ1·A·d
Figure 1. In (a) we represent the nominal wages and the efforts in a single firm for the TVE
case (in black) and the SNE case (in gray). In (b) are depicted the nominal and real productions
of a single firm and the price when profits are 0, the TVE case in black and the SNE case in gray
wb
nom
YTVEnomYTVEreal
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This price function p(q1) is a U-shaped function, considering λ1 = λ1(q1) and
w2 = w2(q1), and then it has an interior minimum. We observe in the figure figure 1
(b) that the 0 profits price is higher in he SNE case, making the firms less competi-
tive.
When firms can choose the tier structure parameter, firms tend to choose near the
structure that lowers the price in order to be more competitive and then obtain addi-
tional profits. This process ends when the price reaches its minimum. Then, the com-
petitive market makes the firms choose a structure that verifies the condition
∂p/∂q1 = 0. The nominal production is a increasing function of q1, but not the real pro-
duction production, that is a hill-shaped function. Note that the maximum of the real
production does not coincide with the minimum price.
5.2. At the whole economy level
When we consider the whole economy, we aggregate the production of all the
firms and the money becomes neutral. Once the nominal minimum wage is estab-
lished by the government, the price is set up by the competition among firms, and
then the real minimum wage is determined. Intuitively, at an aggregated level we can
consider that only one good is produced, and then the agents are payed in real terms
with respect to this good.
We consider now the price of the aggregated production as the price level of the
economy. Because the agents will make the decision of choosing the effort supplied
taking in account the real wages of every tier, let’s traduce the nominal wages to the
real wages. At the whole economy level the real wages are obtained by dividing the
nominal wages by the price, that now coincides with the general price level. We have
that the nominal minimum wage is held exogenously and the real minimum wage is
wb
real
= wb
nom/p, the maximum of the real minimum wage must coincide with the min-
imum of the price. As we said, when the structure parameter is eligible by the firms,
the competition moves the economy to the minimum of the price function, that coin-
cides with the maximum of the real minimum wage. In our problem, the free market
maximizes the purchasing power of the less well payed workers.
In the figure 2 (a) we observe the different real wages and the consequent efforts
reached when the whole economy is considered. Because the 0 profits price was
higher in the SNE case than in the TVE case and the nominal minimum wage is held,
in the whole economy the SNE real minimum wage will be lower than the TVE real
minimum wage. This fact, together with the fact that relation between the nominal
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wage of the tier 2 agents and the nominal minimum wage is higher in the TVE case,
establishes that the real wage of the agents in the tier 2 is high in the TVE case. Final-
ly, because when the whole economy is considered all the real wages tend to 0 when
Q2 tends to Q, the effort supplied tends to 0 in this limit, being higher in the TVE case
in order to produce enough to pay higher real wages.
As we said before the whole economy will tend to be in the minimum of the
price, that coincides with the maximum of the real minimum wage. In this point the
instantaneous utility of the tier 2 agents decreases with Q2, because w2real decreases
with Q2, and because the effort of the tier 1 agents increases with Q2, the instanta-
neous utility of the tier 1 agents is also a decreasing function of Q2. Then, this point
may seem non Pareto efficient, in the sense that lowering Q2 we increase the instan-
taneous utility of both the tier 1 agents and the tier 2 agents, and then we make every-
one better off. Nevertheless, the utility that the agents consider when they make deci-
sions is not the instantaneous utility, but the expected utility.
From (2.6) we can obtain the form of the expected utilities of the first tier workers:
Figure 2. In (a) are depicted real wages and the efforts when the whole economy is consid-
ered for the TVE case (in black) and the SNE case (in gray). In (b) are depicted the average
instantaneous utility in a single firm case (noted with «sf») and when the whole economy is 
considered (noted with «we»), the TVE case in black and the SNE case in gray
wbSNE
real
w2TVE
real
wbTVE
real
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u(w1, λ1)
—————— + q1·U2 u(w1, λ1) d u(w2, 0) q1dU1 = ——————————— = ——————·————— + ——————·—————d + q1 d d + q1 d d + q1
u(w1, λ1) Q1 u(w2, 0) Q2 –u
= ——————·—— + —————·—— = ——
d Q d Q d
where we have used the fact that the all the agents in the tier 1 supply effort both in
the TVE case and in the SNE case. The expected utility of the workers that belong to
the firm in the tier 1, U1, coincides with the average instantaneous utility of the
economy, –u, divided by the death rate d. Note that when the instantaneous utilities of
all the agents in the economy decrease with Q2, the increase of the number of agents
in the tier 2 (with high instantaneous utility) can compensate the decrease of the
instantaneous utilities, and make the average utility rise.
It is interesting to note that when c = 0 in the TVE case, that implies that the tier
1 agents that do not supply effort have a nil probability rate of being upgraded, the
expected utility of the agents in the tier 1 takes the simple form U1 = wbα/d. In this
case we have that the market economy, when the structure of the firms is eligible, will
tend to maximize the expected utility of the agents in the tier 1, and, as we have just
seen, also the average instantaneous utility will be maximized. Then, the competitive
market allows the economy to reach the aggregated social optimum.
The figure 2 (b) represents the different average utilities in the single firm and in
the whole economy depending on Q2. Like nominal and real productions, the average
utilities behave very different in a single firm and at the whole economy level. In a
single firm the average utility is a increasing function of Q2, like the nominal pro-
duction, while the average utility when the whole economy is considered is a hill-
shaped function, like the real production. Although in the TVE case the effort is high-
er than in the SNE case, the higher nominal and real wages make the utilities be
higher than the SNE case, being then the TVE case strictly preferred than the SNE
case.
An important consequence of the figure 2 (b) is that the firms tend to prefer to
have a regulated structure defined by the government, with Q2 as higher as possible.
As we have seen in the figure 1 (b), when Q2 is fixed high the price and the nominal
production are high and, what is more important, the average utility of the members
of this sector is high. But if it is applied to the whole economy, the price level increas-
es and the nominal wages decrease, making the whole average utility decrease. It is
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8 In fact, the Lorentz curve (and then the Gini index) when there are two groups of peo-
ple, the Gini index only depends on the relative wage, wb/w2, and their relative populations,
d/q1.
an example of the fact that what is better for every part of the economy (a regulation
with high Q2 for a sector) can be worse for the whole economy.
As we have seen, the TVE case is more effective than the SNE case, because in
this case the production and the real wages are higher than in the SNE case. It is due
because in the TVE case the agents have a small set of eligible efforts (in fact, they
have only two options compared with all the reals in the SNE case). In the TVE case
the worker can only compare two cases, meanwhile in the SNE case the effort must
be a local optimum. This fact allows to obtain a higher average effort, and then high-
er production, and then real wages in the TVE case. Moreover, although the effort is
higher in the TVE case, it has a higher average instantaneous utility, and then it is also
preferable at a social aggregated level.
5.3. The Gini index
Let’s now look at the inequality produced in this model, and the information that
gives us the Gini index. We will inquire about the existence of the classical tradeoff
between efficiency and equality, and we will analyze the consequences of choose a
value for the firm organization parameter q1, or indirectly choose a minimum wage.
Let’s suppose that the firm faces total profits equal to 0. In order to calculate Gini
index note that the total income is given by Q1·wb + Q2·w2. For a given q1 the Lorentz
curve is the same in the two cases8 is given by
wb·(d+q1) d
————————·σ for σ < ——— ,
d·wb + q1·w2 d + q1
g(σ) = (5.1)
w2·(d+q1) d1 – ———————·(1–σ) for σ > ——— ,
d·wb + q1·w2 d + q1
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
70 FRANCESC DILMÉ I SOTO
This curve is a composition of two straight lines in two different intervals, one 
d
corresponding to the low wage people (from 0 to ————) and the other correspon-
d
d + q1
ding to the high wage people (from ———— to 1), and is depicted in the figure 3 (a) 
d + q1
for a given relative wage (black line) for the TVE case. For the different values of the
wages the vertexes of this curve lay on the curved dashed line. As we can observe this
curve takes the value 1 – α when σ → 1, meaning that in the limit where the great
majority of the agents work in the tier 1, the agents in the tier 2 receive a share α of
the total amount of wages.
The Gini index is defined as the area between the Lorentz curve and the perfect
equality curve divided by the total area under this second line. In our case, the Gini
index takes the following form:
wbd d·——
w2g ≡ 2·∫
0
1
(σ – g(σ))·dσ = ———— – —————— (5.2)
wbd + q d·—— + q
w2
Figure 3. In (a) the Lorentz curve for a given value of the relative wage (in black), and the
gray curve shows all possible locus for the vertexes of the different Lorentz curves for differ-
ent relative wages, all in the TVE case. In (b) us depicted the Gini index with respect number 
of agents in tier 2, for the TVE case (black line) and for the SNE case (gray line)
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The difference among the two cases we have treated arise from the different
dependences among q1/d and the relative wage rw, given in (3.10) and (4.4). We can
depict the Gini index with respect the fraction of workers of the tier 2, and the result
s shown on figure 3 (b), for the TVE case (black line) and for the SNE case (gray
line). We observe that, because the difference among wages is higher in the TVE
case, also the Gini index is higher in this case.
In this picture we observe that Gini index for Q → 0 is not 0, meaning that in this
limit the small number of agents in the tier 2 own an aggregated wage that is a pro-
portion α of the total aggregated wage (this corresponds to σ → 1 in the figure 3 (a)).
We observe an initial increase of the Gini index when the number of workers of the
tier 2 moves from 0. Surprisingly, more egalitarian is the distribution of the income
(when Q2 rises then rw rises and wb approaches to w2), higher is the inequality index.
The increase of agents in tier 2 generates more inequality than the convergence of the
wages. Moreover, in this region, larger is the Gini index, the higher are both the util-
ity of the rich and the poor people. This structure consists in few people with a very
high income and a lot of people with very low wages that, instead of the incentive of
the high difference of wages, tend to supply a low quantity of effort.
Interestingly, as the number of agents in the tier 2 increases there is a maximum
in the index of Gini index. This point corresponds to the moment that the convergence
of the wages compensates the inequality generated by the increase of the agents in the
tier 2. Finally the Gini index decreases with the minimum wage, achieving 0 when all
the agents belong to the second tier. In this point the overall real production is 0,
because there are no incentives to work, as we have seen before. Nevertheless, this
region is Pareto inefficient, because as we have seen, increases in the number of agents
in the tier 2 make the average utility of all the agents in our economy decreases.
CONCLUSIONS
The model we have presented helps us to understand the firm organization and
the wage distribution among the different tiers of jobs within the same firm.
When variables that are important to determine the level of production are not
observable by the firm owner he or she must establish a incentives system to ensure
that the agents provide a certain level of effort. We have modelled this process as
upgrading lotteries among the agents, where the probability of being upgraded
depends stochastically on the effort supplied by the agents. This is a realistic assump-
tion because in fact, the agents know that their success in the firm depends on the
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effort they supply. Agents in the same tier compete for the available vacancies. This
competition makes them supply even though it is not directly observable.
The two cases we have analyzed produce very similar results. In fact, the capac-
ity of the firm owner to choose a level effort or when this level effort is chosen by the
agents produce few differences at the effort supplied and the production obtained by
the firm owner. When there are only two values of effort available by the agents,
because the election set is discrete, it is easy to make the agents supply effort. By the
other hand, when the level effort is elected through a competition process among the
agents, because the effort is continuous, the agents decide a local maximum of the
function, lowering the effort supplied. The difference among the two cases depends
essentially on the effort aversion, parameterized by β, that determines the importance
the possibility of choosing a local maximum.
Competition among firms implies that the prices decrease until the moment that
profits turn to be 0. Because the 0 profits price is strongly related with the structure,
the firms that produce similar goods will have similar structures and wages. Moreover,
the technological changes in the productive process that change the organization
towards the price minimizer scheme will be favored by the market, because the firms
that initially adopt of this kind of technologies will have positive profits temporally.
We have seen that when the firms can be restructured, that is, if the productive
process allows different organization schemes, the structure is changed in order to
decrease the prices and then be more competitive. This process makes the firms more
similar, because there is an unique organization scheme that minimizes the price.
When it is applied at the whole economy level the election of the structure coincides
with the maximization of the real wage of the tier 1 agents is maximized, and also
their utility in the TVE case when c = 0.
The sectors are better off when there are regulations that increase the expected
quantity of high tier workers, for example by regulating the structure or the relative
wage among tiers, because although they make 0 profits we have seen that the aver-
age utility is increased. Although this kind of regulations generate productive ineffi-
ciencies, they increase the nominal output and the welfare of the regulated sector, by
rising the price of the good. Nevertheless, as we have seen, when these regulations
applied to the whole economy the result is a decrease in the overall welfare, and the
economy becomes inefficient.
Although the simplifying assumption of a firm (or the whole economy) organized
only two tiers may seem too simplified, this model is a first step that has allowed us
to obtain many interesting results. In fact, most of the models that consider more than
one role usually consider only two roles. Models with workers and firms, with high-
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ly skilled and low skilled workers, models with producers and predators, models with
landowners and peasants,..., are models that help us to explain some observed facts
and that allow us to understand them better. Albeit the reality is far of being as sim-
ple as only having two roles, because there are a lot of different roles and people
assuming many of them at the same time, the simple models allow us to analyze
many effects observed in the reality.
Inequality indexes, like the Gini index, may not be a good indicator of the wel-
fare of the people. As we have seen the Gini index is maximized (and then the
inequality reaches its maximum) near the zone where the minimum real wage is also
maximized. Moreover, the Gini index decreases as the proportion of tier 2 agents
approximates to 1, when the real wages of both the tier 1 and the tier 2 agents
approach to 0. Then, the imposition of certain equality laws sometimes imply low
Gini indexes, but reduce the real wage and utility of all the agents in the economy,
and then they leave the economy in a non Pareto efficient situation.
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